and the Seeretariat of the Convention on Biologieal Diversity (the CBD Seeretariat). lronieally, it is the aim of the CBD to integrate eeonomie and environmental polieies by using eeonomie measures for environment al poliey goals. It is preeisely these measures that have eneountered the most outspoken eritieism as not being in line with trade diseiplines. It will be shown that the politieal stalemate that has oeeurred between these two organisations has not bloeked the politieal proeess whieh took plaee beyond intergovernmental polities. We will see that classieal forms of publie internationallaw have been superseded by new kinds of law whieh are to be qualified as not legally binding and whieh address private parties direetly under the eover of an apparently intergovernmental arrangement.4 This evolution has taken two forms. On the one hand, a new additional type of publie internationallaw has emerged whieh gives eredit to internationally aetive private entities; on the other hand, these new forms push for the relegalisation of the phenomena that have developed, both nationally and internationally.
The hypothesis is twofold. First, as trade and environmental polieies are mutually intertwined, politieal processes dealing with this relations hip ean be slowed down by bloekages in international organisations, but ultimately they eannot be prevented. Seeondly, a bloekage in one forum sometimes paradoxieally aeeelerates developments in others. Normative eonclusions ean be drawn from this. In order to pereeive these phenomena in the first plaee and to understand them subsequently, we need to turn to the observation of regimes, in this ease regime eomplexes,5 and to governanee theory. In the interplay of the various fora, politieal pressure is built up, the integration of environmental and eeonomie polieies oeeurs, and ehanges in the fabrie of eeonomie institutions take plaee. The diseussion about mandatory geographie al indieations in patent applieation proeedures will serve as an example (Seetion III). Before that, how the WTO has dealt with the ehallenges of environmental poliey will be reviewed, and the emerging patterns will be deseribed in broad terms (Seetion 11). After the analysis of the CBD-TRIPS eonfliet, the ehapter will expose the tensions in WTO governanee patterns in the light of modern regime theory and global environmental governanee literature (Seetion IV). It will close with some refleetions on what the debate about environmental governanee may eontribute to the overall debate about the 'eonstitutionalisation' of the WTO and international trade poliey (Seetion V).
ILl The Prineiple of Vertieal Poliey Segregation
The eoneeptual eentre of the trade and environment interface is Article XX GATT. It has served as a blueprint for WTO norms such as Article XIV GATS. These norms provide for an exeeption from international trade diseiplines for proteetive national regulation. They serve a double funetion. One the one hand, they eushion regulatory sovereignty against trade diseiplines. On the other, they relegate publie poliey from international trade organisations to the level of the nation-state. Aeeording to these norms, soeial regulation ean be demoeratieally embedded only at national level. The distinetion between internationally eonvened produet norms and nationally aeeountable proeess norms is rooted in this prineiple. However, even in the 1980s, the idea of a clear-eut division of labour between GATT and nation-states had already shifted from one of mutual exclusiveness to one of mutual supportiveness. As a result, various integration clauses were not only negotiated in the eonstitutive treaties of the WTO in 1994, but were also introdueed into the Preamble to the WTO Agreement.6 A special environmental division in the WTO Seeretariat and a Committee for Trade and Environment (CTE), both of whieh report to the Couneil of Ministers, were established.7 The Doha Agenda of 2001 reinforeed the mantra of mutual supportiveness of trade and environmental polieies. For a eritieal aeeount of these two bodies, refer to Ulrike Ehling's ehapter in this volume.
11.2The Prineiple of Horizontal Poliey Segregation
More important for the trade and environment debate in general, and for the relationship between TRIPS and the CBD in partieular, is the prineiple of horizontal policy segregation in international relations, which demands non-co-ordination.8 It serves a double function: an administrative and a normative one.
With regard to the administration of treaties, the principle requires that secretariats restriet their communication with others to aminimum, and that they do not convene integrative policies on their own. Horizontal policy integration which aims at balancing competing policy interests is supposed to be restricted to the national realm, where institutions are legitimised (at best democratically).9 International organisations must pursue their defined mandate and co-ordinate national policies only by a process of continuous consultation. Consequently, international organisations with different mandates hesitate to co-ordinate their policies. Thus, the argument that the WTO should adhere to its mission to promote free tradelO is fully in line with this basic principle.
Attempts Thus, the question of observer status has become a bargaining chip in highlighting strategie interests which result in the sacrificing of information exchange.23 Policy integration seems to be sacrificed to strategie intergovernmental bargaining in a manner which amounts to forum shopping.24 The opportunistic move of discussions from one international organisation to the other is structurally due to the segregation principle.
With regard to normative content, the horizontal segregation principle predetermines the ultimate conflict rules between conflicting treaties. Although international law generally presumes that international treaties are consistent and non-contradictory, in cases of conflict judges turn to conflict rules such as the lex posterior or the lex specialis rule.25Both predetermine 'either or' answers and gear the trade and environmental debate. Due to this fundamental conflict, the CTE Regular and Special Sessions are mandated to clarify the relationship between the WTO Agreements and the MEAs. However, negotiations have been diffuse. Several competing propos als were submitted.28 Unexpectedly, the UNEP argued against a clearcut rule and favoured a case-by-case approach.29 Some advocated for the inclusion of the MEAs in Article XX GATT30-leaving the relationship with the other WTO Treaties such as SPS, TBT, TRIPS and GATS unresolved. Others argued in favour of a general clause modelled on NAFTA.J1 Consensus is not within reach. . The introduction of a clause similar to Art 104 NAFTA is proposed, applicable when both parties are contracting parties to the MEA in question. 32 Charnovitz comments: 'In conclusion, it is not possible to imagine the WTO agreeing to a broader MEA mandate now, or at the end of the [Doha] Round. Considering the issue in the round is the wrong forum, with wrong negotiationg dynamics. Writing articles about the problem or holding new symposia isn't going to make a difference': S Charnovitz, 'Expanding the MEA Mandate in the Doha Agenda', GETS-e-version (2003) , available at http:// www.gets.org/pages!steve.charnovitz.cfm (last visited Jan 2006). Charnovitz proposed a procedural approach: before a dispute involving MEA regulation may be carried to the DSU, the specific dispute settlement in the MEA, if it exists, must be exhausted. The DSU panel shall seek the advice of the Parties to the MEA upon request before interpreting the law and shall secure necessary expertise modelIed on para 4 GATS Annex on Financial Services.
The WTO Dispute Settlement
The WTO Dispute Settlement deserves special consideration as its rulings calibrate the delimitations of horizontal and vertical segregation. As long as the GATT panel was in charge, the rulings were still narrowly determined by the concepts of horizontal and vertical segregation. It is in this concept that the fundamental distinction between process and production measures (PPMs) and product rules is rooted. PPMs are not to be governed by trade rules. They deal only with effects inside a given sovereign country. Product rules, however, 'travel with' the product across borders and affect 45 The following are ground-breaking: RO Koehane, 'The Demand for International Regimes ' (1982) shifts the centre of activity back to nation-states and private actors. As regime theory has taught us, practical solutions are invented which reconcile economic and environmental policies.45 One example of this is the international transfer of genetic and biological material.
The issue of integrating trade and the environment in the international transfer of biological material became crystalised as a question of inconsistency between the TRIPS and the CBD.46TRIPS sets minimum standards for national patent regulation. It is part of the constitutive body of multilateral agreements that a country signs when acceding to the WTO. The CBD was the only legally binding instrument which countries had agreed upon at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio (UNCED) in 1992. It is a convention with almost global membership. 188 countries have signed it, as compared to 147 for the WTO and 191 for the UN. It was amended by the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2000 and the Bonn Guidelines in 2002. However, one important country has not yet ratified the CBD: the USY Initially, the US even refused to sign it-arguing that the CBD violates general principles of patent law.48After TRIPS came into force, the dominant argument shifted to the dogmatic argument that TRIPS would override the CBD.
In contrast to its name, the CBD is not a pure convention for environmental protection. The global loss of species propelled activities of both economic and environmental communities. Without this unusual coalition, the CBD would not have come into being. As an offspring of the UNCED Conference, the convention aims at 'sustainable development', geared to the integration of environmental and economic policies. It builds on the realisation of their mutual dependency and instrumentalises both: economic instruments for environmental policy goals and, vice versa, environmental 43 Ibid. Amicus curiae briefs may become instrumental in qualifying anational measure as either being protectionist or environmental in nature in the future. In the Shrimps-Turtle Appellate Body Report, n 35 above, they were first held to be legitimately considered by the Appellate Body autonomously-without being submitted by one of the parties. In a wider sense, the question of who may bring facts legitimately to the attention of the Dispute Settlement Body may eventually change the nature of the actual procedure: see R Howse, 'Membership and its Privileges: the WTO, Civil Sciety, and the Amicus Brief Controversy' (2003) 9 European Law Journal 496. 44 For a critical account of the sovereignty argument, see K Raustiala, 'Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law' (2003) 6 Journal of International Economic Law 841; for a critical account of the regulation to other fora, see Raustiala and Victor, n 5 above, for the latter. proteetion for eeonomie prosperity-an uneasy marriage. A eentral eontentious issue is the benefit-sharing duty. As an overarehing goal, it is spelled out in Article 1 CBD, and as a eonerete duty in Article 15(7) CBD. It demands that eaeh eontraeting party take measures 'with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the eommereial and other utilisation of genetie resourees'. The clause rests on the eeonomie rationale that only a person who has an ineentive to proteet the environment will do SO. 49 In the beginning, the main argument was about the ineonsistencies between these two treaties. The developing countries claimed that the CBD preseribed benefit-sharing whieh resulted from the use of biologieal resourees. As the TRIPS Agreement alloeates all profits to the holder of the property right, they argued that it violated the CBD.50Consequently, they demanded that it be amended.51 Conversely, the industrialised countries claimed that the CBD violated the TRIPS Agreement for the same reason.52 Distributive polieies would not be in line with this mission. From this standpoint, the industrialised countries opposed rules whieh would provide for the retraeeability of material as being solely distributive, such as the disclosure rule in patent applieation proeedures. 
However, irrespeetively of this stalemate, things did develop in praetiee. Various industries aetive in the development of eosmeties, bioteehnology, food, pharmaeeutieals and erops are not autarkie but depend on aeeess to genetie and biologieal resourees in biodiversity-rieh countries. After national sovereignty over genetie resourees was internationally aeknowledged by the CBD in 1992, biodiversity-rieh countries issued regulations making aeeess eonditional on permits and benefit-sharing. The stalemate in the TRIPS Couneil instigated striet aeeess regulation in biodiversity-rieh eountries (mainly in the developing world), thus impeding bio-prospeeting.57 At the same time, industry, institutions and jurisdietions in biodiversity-rieh countries started to experiment with benefit-sharing arrangements. 58Not-withstanding the allegations of developed countries that mandatory disclosure rules were in violation of TRIPS, some developing countries instituted these rules as patentability eonditions.59 Industry embarked on eontraetual arrangements.60 Ironieally, the US National Institute of Health (NIH) beeame a forerunner in supporting eomplex eontraetual experiments whieh aimed at using genetie resourees and attributing benefits to the eountry and to the loeal eommunities where the resouree was found.61 A typieal feature of these multipolar eontraets is the inclusion of both, eommereial and noneommereial entities such as research institutions, universities and botanieal gardens. The inclusion of commercial partners is to ensure actual and future benefit-sharing. 'Intermediaries', such as universities and research institutions, have an important structural function as a buffer zone between competing interests. Their task is to filter and secure information about where and with which method the resource was found (i.e. by random screening or by conveyed traditional knowledge), and to provide a shield against unauthorised disclosure of information that is deemed to be sacred. The ultimate goal of these arrangements is to channel benefits back into the communities. However, they also provide a reasonable basis for the calculation of future shares and (by discriminating between different knowledge types) for preventing commercial partners from escaping into a neighbouring country, thus foregoing their contractual duties. With the passing of time, access permits and benefit-sharing have become a standard for industrial and academic bio-prospectors. Field researchers risk future funding, their reputation and the commercial development of their research results; industrial partners, on their part, fear non-patentability and being publicly blamed for bio-piracy if they do not adhere to their moral obligation.
These developments put pressure on governments to come up with rules which could contain potential free-riders and ultimately improve access.62 Rules were sought that could provide for more transparency and build up consensus about equity in benefit-sharing contracts. Thus, the CBD invited 'case studies', and, in 1998, a Panel of Experts on Access and BenefitSharing was set up. This body finally submitted draft guidelines which were presented in Bonn in November 2001 and approved by the CBD Conference of Parties as the 'Bonn Guidelines' in 2002.63 On the one hand, they provide guidance for drafting access regulation. For example, one national focal point is to be established from which a bio-prospector will be provided with all relevant information,64 and the rules of access have to be simple and transparent.65 On the other hand, the Bonn Guidelines provide guidance for drafting benefit-sharing arrangements. Addressees are not only governments, but 'providers' and 'recipients' in general-broken down into provider and recipient states, and private providers and recipients.66 Part IV of the Bonn Guidelines guide contract parties through the process. They must first devise a mutual, overarching strategy and then define their intermediate goals.67A list of principles is to guide contracting partners in drafting their texts and in addressing their mutual or concurrent interests.68This 62 Regime Building Through Implementation': see Raustiala and Victor, n 5 above, at 302. 63 
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includes a concise check-list of contract clauses for benefit-sharing arrangements that condense prior experiences.69 They also call for compliance with environmental access rules as a precondition to patentability-thus combining environmental and economic policy instruments.70 The Bonn Guidelines are perceived as a first step to a more consolidated regime. In September 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development?l called on the CBD to create an 'international regime' -a call which the parties to the CBD Conference of Parties (COP) followed by establishing a working group in February 2004 mandating it with negotiations for a draft proposal,72 which it submitted in February 2006.
1lI.3 Emerging Rules through Evolving Practice
Whether a legally binding protocol on the transfer of genetic resources will ultimately be agreed upon is an open question for now. Whereas the atmosphere in the TRIPS Council has cooled down, tensions have risen at CBD meetings where discussions have become more diffuse. The change of atmosphere in the TRIPS Council may be partly due to a change in the position of the EC/3 and/or partly due to a proceduralisation of discussions as the mega-diverse countries transformed their former demand of the 'tripOd'74into a 'checklist'.75 As the CBD moves to tackle technical questions, questions on benefit-sharing still seem to be very much contested.76 Discussions revolve around certification schemes. However, these discussions are not necessarily connected with the 'tripod' claim, as this is usually considered to be patentability-related.77 Nor has the relationship been cleared between the redistributive and the environmental function of benefit-sharing. 78 However, whatever the outcome will be, it seems that benefit-sharing arrangements have made their way into practice. Patents are no longer the key to the remuneration discourse and have become just one form of benefit-sharing. Benefit-sharing as such has became a social norm in the Weberian sense that bio-prospection is legitimate ('deserves recognition') only when 'prior informed consent' was asked for and was provided (concurrently as astate permit and/or a private consent by indigenous communities) and a benefit-sharing arrangement was made.
IV. PATIERNS OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
These findings are consistent with various streams of thoughts in political science. In the next section, they will be reviewed in brief.
IV.t Regime-building
First, these findings seem consistent with regime theory. Regime theory seeks to reach beyond the clear-cut instruments of public internationallaw. Krasner defines regimes as 'implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge',79 To regime theorists, it is 'not prescription but prediction' that makes regime-building emerge.80 The dictum pinpoints the relative importance of legally binding law and principles in international policy-making, and insinuates that the ideas and the vision of key players can be more important than rules and principles. It also implies that open adaptive processes of rule-making may be more solid, as the system may more easily react to the 
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changes and adapt to the developments that emerge and deserve to be reinforced. Two aspects seem to converge in regime theory.
On the one hand, regimes integrate various policies that typically cut across the mandates of various 'single issue' organisations, thus giving rise to the more recent term of 'Open-Architecture Integrated Governance'. 81 The formation of a regime is typically accompanied by innovative stategies. Most prominently, the consensus principle, both as a key principle to international negotiations and as a major instrument to obstruct policies, is complemented by majority rules, 82time-lines, drop-out options and differentiated duties. Political science has identified issue density as the key for the development of international regimes.83With regard to its cross-cutting nature, the CBD has been described as a 'regime' from very early on.84 A more recent account focussing on the organisations involved coined the term 'regime complex', 85which describes more accurately the international landscape in which the CBD talks take place.
On the other hand, regime theory points to institutional changes that are geared by normative changes-and vice versa. By now, there is social consensus that benefit-sharing is a duty when using genetic resources. The prevailing notion is that the duty primarily arises when the resource was found in a country that is not the one where the resource is used ,or marketed (transnational transfer). The Bonn Guidelines react to this change in social norms, although they do not yet amount to political consensus and governments still struggle to formulate rules. Yet, in their subtlety, the Bonn Guidelines overcome the stalemate between the TRIPS Council and the CBD. 
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The second stream of thought with which the Bonn Guidelines seem to be consistent is that governance literature which revolves around policymaking is not confined to governments. Schuppert describes governance theory as a modern strand of regulation theory. He understands it as a reaction to the interventionist failure and as the development of policy networks and the inclusion of private actors.86 Governance arrangements react to public policy needs without resorting to regulation. They gain legitimacy by effectively integrating diverse and competing interests, bolstered by participation and transparency. Governance regimes have responded to both regulatory and democratic failures,87 and the social functionality of markets.88 However, one important insight of modern governance theory seems to be that these new inclusive governance arrangements cannot do without law. As much as they thrive to escape the traditional set-up of legal regulation, they still depend on those functions of law that stabilise communication and provide legitimacy, thus contributing to re-legalisation. In this sense, the Bonn Guidelines provide a prime example of a governance regime in both aspects. First, they not only address governments. They stick to the intergovernmental paradigm only as far as access regulation is concerned. However, their policy centres are contract principles and clauses that shape the normative idea about the equity of benefitsharing arrangements. The Bonn Guidelines reach beyond governments to private actors and are geared to governing contracts, both private-public relationships and contracts between private actors. Thus, the Bonn Guidelines react to the modern private-public mix that has been described as being at the centre of the turn from government to governance. Secondly, as much as they contribute to forming these new arrangements beyond traditional law, they also exert pressure on nation states to conceive an internationally binding regime and to provide effective national regulation in support of the newly emerging governance arrangements.
goods' in the very sense of the term's meaning in economic theory, such as the ozone layer, the oceans and their beds, the Arctic and Antarctica.89 Others are situated inside territorial boundaries, although their conservation depends on international co-operation, such as the protection of migratory species or the regulation of the trade in hazardous wastes and substances. Because of its cross-cutting nature, which makes the assignment of regulation to just one organisation difficult, the principle of horizontal segregation is put into question. This is especially the case for trade measures and economic incentives which integrate environmental and economic policies. As the problem cannot be territorially confined, sovereignty and, thus, the mode of horizontal policy segregation are put into question. These features challenge traditional concepts of vertical and horizontal order in policy-making. And so does the CBD. MEAs,94legally, their priority on trade disciplines has not been challenged. Even though there is as yet no consensus on the technical inclusion as a 'window' or 'waiver', it cannot be argued that trade measures are not accepted as integrated environmental policy instruments.
(b) Policy Integration II: Economic Incentives as Environmental Policy Instruments
The principle of horizontal policy segregation is equally challenged by the mirror-image constellation of trade-enhancing instruments for environmental policy purposes. A sibling to the CBD mechanism is trading in greenhouse gas allowances.95 Its system is administered by the respective environmental administrations. Here, too, compatibility with GATT principles has been questioned. However, its consistency with GATT has not been seriously put into question. These evolutions have made it clear that environmental policy is intrinsically intertwined with economic policies and cannot be separated from them. The CBD created property rights in genetic resources and traditional knowledge for the sake of better management of the environment. Its goal is to institute a contract-based transfer of these goods, thus making benefitsharing possible as a means of providing people with incentives for conserving natural resources. The contract-based transfer of resources was functionally conceived so as to achieve both benefit-sharing and conservation.
(c) Sovereignty Revisited
Environmental cross-cutting policies are as challenging to the principle of horizontal segregation as the public-good character is to the traditional concepts of sovereignty. Accordingly, any country must regulate its own problems inside its own territory. The boundaries of this concept have been tackled by various MEAs, most prominently by the Kyoto and the Montreal Protocols. 96 The CBD continues in the same vein. It protects biological .diversity as a common concern of humankind,97 while at the same time reaffirming the national sovereignty of biological resources.98 The inherent tension of common concern and sovereignty is mirrored in various Articles of the Convention-and yet it is ultimately unresolved. A lot of conflicts between developed and developing countries in the CBD can be described along these lines. Developing countries are eager to regulate their access rules autonomously and to pursue their policies of benefit-sharing. Developed countries reject claims for disclosure rules, not least because they oppose a mechanism that could demand the recognition of an international act or an act of a foreign state (access permit, benefit-sharing arrangement, certificate) as a precondition for their own governmental acts-here, the issuing of a patent.99
V. CONCLUSION FOR THE OVERALL DEBATE ON CONSTITUTIONALISM
What do these findings contribute to the overall debate on constitutionalisation? This last section surveys the broad debate about constitutionalisation, and identifies the relationship between this debate and environmental governance. From there, it sets out concrete conclusions for the WTO constitutionalisation debate.
V.1 Constitutionalism-a Broad Claim on Legitimacy
The terms 'constitutionalism' or 'constitutionalisation' have become buzzwords. They evoke assumptions about legitimacy being at the heart of every constitution and referring to a 'good order'. The quest for legitimacy is their driving force and the sujet of the overall globalisation process (the 'post-national constellation'). The terms touch on a broad range of topics, from the relations hip between the individual and the state (human rights,100 rule of law in the continental Prussian sense enshrined in the idea of Gesetzesvorbehalt, judicial review101),to the relationship between law and politics (rule of law in the Anglo-American sense, understood as the relations hip between parliament and the executive, and the separation of powers102),to the transformation of the nature of states103and their tasks.104 Other assumptions allude to the internaIorganisation (the relationship between territorial entities, supremaey, and subsidiarity105) and the relationship between markets and the state.106Another strand puts the demoeratie, non-state-eentrie quest at the eentre of reasoning.107 All raise questions of good governanee (gute Herrschaft) whieh have emerged sinee regulation has beeome internationalised, thus eseaping from the eonfines of the nation-state for whieh all the eoneepts have been eoined.
Here, the foeus is poliey co-ordination (synonymous with poliey integration). It has beeome aprerequisite of legitimate modern rule, and thus a eonstitutional norm in the twentieth eentury. In order to rule legitimately, the state has to take into aeeount and to provide struetures and proeedures that guarantee the inclusion of10Sall aspeets of a negotiated poliey. Eeonomie interests do not deserve priority per se. This idea has been eoined by eonstitutionallaw theory as 'praetieal eoncordanee', in German 'Praktische Konkordanz' . 109 So far, the eonstitutional debate about environmental poliey in international trade law has revolved around national V.2 Global Environmental Governance and Constitutionalism Oren Perez was the first to argue that environmental governanee theory could contribute to the eonstitutionalisation debate. It would provide for a more 'pragmatie and contextual readiness to live with polycentrie eonstitutionalisation'.112 He referred to divergent rationalities that eould enhance the responsiveness of international aetors. His example was the IME Key to his reasoning is integration. However, while Perez' analysis is empirical in nature, the argument here complements his findings in eoneeptual terms. Global environmental governance enriehes the current debate on eonstitutionalism, as it refines the idea of sovereignty and its safeguarding of legal sub-struetures. The impetus is threefold. First, it shows that most global problems are not effieiently dealt with within the national realm. The most successful regimes have curtailed sovereignty. Seeondly, global environmental problems have to be taekled as international eeonomie problems. Thirdly, effective regimes depend on the inclusion of private aetors. Thus, environmental governance theory challenges the eentral coneepts of intergovernmental poliey whieh are coneeived to safeguard (democratie) sovereignty. The principles of vertical and horizontal segregation turn out to obstruct eonstruetive problem-solving.
Dwelling on the given example of genetic resourees, the conclusion has to be drawn that economic institutions such as private property cannot be eonfined either to the TRIPS Council or to the CBD Secretariat. The Bonn Guidelines have transformed the notion of intelleetual property that the WTO aspires to uphold.ll3 The case of the international transfer of genetic resources shows that solutions emerge in practice where environmental and economic eoneerns are reeoneiled, even if institutions such as the TRIPS 113 Argument elaborated in Godt, n 9 above .
governmental aetivity (vertieal segregation). Whereas national regulation is supposed to secure basic rights with regard to the exeeution of eeonomic rights by others,110and international eeonomie law subjeets national publie poliey to trade diseiplines, national regulation is apriori pereeived as a barrier to trade. Thus, hitherto, the debate about trade and environment has been very mueh dominated by national sovereignty as the key eonstitutional norm.111
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Council resist ta king this development into account. We face the paradox that diverting the problem-solving process to other institutions results in accepting the transformation of economic institutions that is driven by nonpurely economic organisations. 114 The Bonn Guidelines and the actual contractual arrangements on benefit-sharing are an example of the fact that the segregation principle of international relations as a constitutional norm is de facta being undermined.
V.3 Components of WTO Constitutionalisation
If it is true that the erosion of the principle of horizontal segregation is consistent with a modern perception of the legitimacy of international politics, then it follows that the rhetoric of the WTO 'being a single-issue organisation' is not legitimate. By responding to environmental claims the WTO will not turn into an environmental organisation. In fact, it will not influence environmental policies any more than by pursuing its strict policy of negative trade integration. The state of the art is that it interferes with both national and international environmental policies by constantly claiming that anything but negative integrating policies is inconsistent with WTO law. Vice versa, legitimacy is not safeguarded when the WTO turns to positive integration. Positive or negative regulation is not at issue here.us With regard to the constitutional norm of policy integration, members act 'legitimately' if they use the WTO to react more responsibly to national and international quests of economic adaptation to the aims of environmental policy. The current resistance to dealing with environmental issues foils the commitments made in the Doha Declaration of 2001.116 Doha Declaration No 31 (DD) acknowledges the 'mutual supportiveness' of trade and environment. In No 31(i) DD, members committed themselves to negotiating the relationship between trade rules and MEAs. In No 31(ii) DD, they committed themselves to regular information exchange between the MEA Secretariat and the WTO committees. Article 32(ii) DD calls upon the CTE to negotiate the environmental provisions of TRIPS. Beyond entering into the required negotiations, one concrete undertaking to bring about policy integration is to seeure environmental expertise in the CTE sessions.ll7 Another one would be to grant observer status to requesting MEAs in all WTO committees and councils, especially to the CBD Secretariat in the 114 An argument elaborated by the author earlier in ibid. 115 This dimension is explored by J Scott, n 39 above. 116 Irrespective of the precise legal status of the Declaration: see P Rott, 'The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the Subsequent Process-Good News for Public Health?' [2003] 
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TRIPS Council. Another one would be to enter into negotiations in the TRIPS Council on how to integrate a certification scheme that is consistent with the non-discrimination discipline. From the normative perspective, the current position of the members in the TRIPS Council to obstruct discussions about the shape of intellectual property lacks legitimacy.
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